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The parametric version of cumulative prospect theory proposed by
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) (T and K) to accommodate violations
of standard expected utility assumes a piecewise power value
function. This formulation has been employed in a great deal of
experimental and theoretical analysis. For instance the power value
parameters have been estimated from experimental data, see e.g.
Tversky and Kahneman (1992), Camerer and Teck-Hua (1994), Wu
and Gonzalez (1996) and Abdellaoui et al. (2007). From a theoretical
perspective the formulation has been employed, for example, to
explain the equity risk premium puzzle (Benartzi and Thaler, 1995) or
that in contrast to standard expected utility that a security's own
skewness can be priced (Barberis and Huang, 2008).
However there is also a literature, which suggests that many
experimental outcomes and theoretical analyses are inconsistent with
the assumption of power value functions. For instance Neilson and
Stowe (2002) consider a number of experimental results and show
that the T and K specification cannot simultaneously account for both
the Allais paradox over large payoff choices and other strong choice
patterns from experiments. They state that the most obviousconclusion of their work is that alternative functional forms are
needed.
This finding is supported by the experimental results reported by
Binswanger (1980), Hershey and Shoemaker (1980) and Holt and
Laury (2002). In their experiments the probabilities, in a sequence of
gambles, are kept fixed as agents choose either between a gamble and
its certainty equivalent or between a “safer” and “more risky” gamble.
They found that increases in payoff levels, real or hypothetical, lead
agents to switch their choice from the gamble (more risky gamble) to
the certainty equivalent (safer gamble).This switch in choice, given
probabilities remain fixed, is also in consistent with a power value
function.
Rieger (2007) also notes that the power value function cannot
describe the very risk-averse choices made in some experiments
involving two-outcome lotteries.
There are also theoretical limitations of the power value function
in applications in finance. For example De Giorgi and Hens (2006)
consider some applications in portfolio theory. They demonstrate that
the power value function leads to the non-existence of equilibrium
and suggest the exponential function as an alternative.
Another limitation of the power value function is that it violates
the assumption of loss aversion for small enough symmetric gains or
losses (see e.g. Köbberling and Wakker (2005), Schmidt and Zank
(2005)). In fact the agent ultimately becomes gain seeking, rather
than loss-averse over small enough symmetric gambles. As a
consequence any optimal model of gambling based on power value
2 Easily seen by dividing the expo-power function by the arbitrary constant 1−e−r.
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K (see e.g. Cain et al. (2008)).
An expo-power value function nests both the power and
exponential value functions. Our purpose in this letter is to
demonstrate that the assumption of an expo-power value function
is consistent, depending on the degree of probability distortion
assumed, to explain all or nearly all the majority choices in ten Allais
experiments involving both small and large payoffs. Neither the
power, or to a lesser extent, the exponential value functions can do
this. In addition because the expo-power function also nests the
exponential value function it can also be employed in non-
experimental areas such as portfolio selection.
2. Some analysis
Cumulative prospect theory as set out by T and K, using the
notation and formulation of Neilson and Stowe, has the following
general form for a gamble composed of m+n+1 monetary out-
comes, x−m,b…bx0b…bxn, which occur with probabilities p−m, …,
pn, respectively.
Vðx; pÞ = Vþðx; pÞ + V−ðx : pÞ ð1Þ

























The preference value of the gamble is given by Eq. (1) where V+
measures the value of gains, and V− measures the value of losses.
The value or utility function is given by u(x) with u(x)=0. The
function g(p) is a probability weighting function assumed to be
increasing with g(0)=0 and g(1)=1.
In their parametric formulation T and K assumed that the






This function implies that small probabilities are over weighted
and larger ones under weighted.
Assuming the power value function
uðxÞ = xα ð5Þ
where 0bαb1 an example of the T and K formulation of the expected
value of the three outcome gamble, zero, $1, $5 with probabilities
















0α ð6Þ1 As noted by Neilson and Stowe (2002) in cumulative prospect theory, whether for
gains or losses extreme outcomes are weighted first. They note this differs from rank





where r and n are positive constants.
For n≤1 the agent is everywhere risk-averse over gains as
postulated by T and K. For n=1 we obtain the exponential function.
The expo-power function also has the convenient property, found
by employing L'Hopital's rule, that as r→0 the function approximates
the power value function.2
In Table 1 we report the parameter values that are consistent with
the majority choices in a number of Allais experiments when we
employ the probability weighting function (4)3 in conjunction with a
power value function, an exponential value function and the expo-
power function.
The ten Allais experiments we employ are the choices between
(a) A: a certain 1 million or B: a p=0.89 chance of 1 million, p=0.1
chance of 5 million and p=0.01 chance of nothing (Allais, 1953)
(b) C: p=0.10 chance of 5 million or D: a p=0.11 chance of
1 million (Allais, 1953)
(c) E: a certain 3000 or F: a p=0.80 chance of 4000 (T and K (1992))
(d) G: a p=0.20 chance of 4000 or H: a p=0.25 chance of 3000
(T and K (1992))
(e) I: a certain 2400 or J: a p=0.66 chance of 2400, p=33 chance
of 2500 and p=0.01 chance of nothing (T and K (1992))
(f) K: a p=0.33 chance of 2500 or L: a p=0.34 chance of 2400
(T and K (1992))
(g) M: a certain 5 or N: a p=0.89 chance of 5, p=0.1 chance of 25
and p=0.01 chance of nothing (Conlisk, 1989)
(h) O: a p=0.10 chance of 25 or P: a p=0.11 chance of 5 (Conlisk,
1989)
(i) Q: a certain 7 or R: a p=0.75 chance of 7, p=0.2 chance of
10 million and, p=0.05 chance of nothing (List and Haigh,
2005)
(j) S: p=0.2 chance of 10 or T: a p=0.25 chance of 7. (List and
Haigh, 2005)
In each case the majority choice in their experiments is the first in
the pair of choices, e.g. ANB,
Q N R:
T and K suggested parameter values of n=0.88 and δ=0.61 for
the power value parameter and the probability distortion parameter
respectively.
We note immediately from Table 1 that the parametric formula-
tion of T and K cannot simultaneously explain the majority choice in
the original classic large stake Allais experiment , ANB, and other
experiments involving larger stakes. For example the value of the
power exponent required to explain the majority choices, ANB and
GNH or KNL given degrees of probability distortion captured by
0.61≤δ≤0.9 are inconsistent.
Of course the power function cannot be consistent with a majority
choice of the safe outcome in large payoff Allais experiments and the
risky choice in small payoff experiments given they involve the same
probabilities and differ solely by a constant scale factor. This is the
case for experiments with the choices ANB and MNN.where r and θ are positive constants. This function is everywhere risk-averse over
gains but has the properties that as θ→0 the function approximates the expo-power
value function and as r→0 and θ→0 the power value function. In fact it made little
difference for the range of payoffs we consider here.
3 Employing the form in Prelec (1998) makes no major difference to our results.
Table 1
Parameter values for majority choices in certain Allais experiments.
Majority choice e.g. ANB, KNL Power Expo-power Expo-power
n=1 r=0.00001








































nN0.029 nN0.049 nN0.052 rb0.617 rb0.519 rb0.504 nN0.029 nN0.049 nN0.052
List & Haigh QNR
Q. $10⁎20%+$7⁎75%
R. $7
nN1.638 nN0.843 nN0.753 None rb0.0396 rb0.064 nN1.638 nN0.843 nN0.753
List & Haigh SNT
S. $10⁎20%
T. $7⁎25%
nN0.306 nN0.505 nN0.546 rb0.243 rb0.148 rb0.132 nN0.306 nN0.505 nN0.546
Overall None None None None None None None 0.883bnb0.902 0.888bnb0.900
328 D.A. Peel, J. Zhang / Economics Letters 105 (2009) 326–329Employing a small value of r the expo-power function approx-
imates the power function over small payoff outcomes. We employ a
value of r=0.00001. Not surprisingly we observe in Table 1 that the
value of the exponent in the expo-power required to obtain the
majority outcomes over small payoffs, for the given degrees of
probability distortion, MNN, ONP, QNR, and SNT, are identical for the
power and expo-power functions. However unlike the power function
the expo-power function now permits a range of parameter values
that are consistent with majority choices over both large and small
payoffs. For instance values of n=0.88 and δ=0.61 are consistent
with the majority outcomes in all the experiments except the small
stake payoff of List and Haigh (QNR). In order to explain this majority
outcomewe require less probability distortion than assumed by T and
K. In fact with lower degrees of probability distortion assumed, δ
around 0.85, the expo-power function permits a range of values that
are consistent with all majority choices. This falls into the surprisingly
narrow range 0.882≤n≤0.902.
The exponential function is nested by the expo-power function.
We observe that with a small value of r, in the range 0.000002b
rb0.0000259 (experiments ANB, CND), the function is consistent
with all the majority choices except List and Haigh (QNR). However
for lower degrees of probability distortion this is not the case and the
function is inconsistent with the majority choices CND and ENF.3. Conclusion
There is a great deal of experimental as well as theoretical research
that is inconsistentwith the assumption of a power value specification
in cumulative prospect theory.
The expo-power function, for suitable parameter values, nests the
power value function and also the exponential function. We
considered ten Allais experiments involving large and small payoffsand calculated the parameter values consistent with the majority
choices.
We showed that the expo-power function can, unlike the power or
exponential value function, explain the majority outcomes in all ten
different Allais experiments, involving both small and large payoffs,
when thedegreeof probability is less thanassumedbyTandK.However
the feasible range of parameter values in this case is surprisingly narrow.
When the degree of probability distortion is the same as that
assumed by T and K the expo-power function can explain all except
one of themajority choices. This is the experiment over small stakes of
List and Haigh (2005). This experiment is surely worthy of replication
since a majority choice of the risky option implies a degree of
probability distortion which is substantially less than assumed by T
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